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Poetry and the discourse of happiness in 
nineteenth-century France: the case of Vigny 
 
Patrick O’Donovan 
 
 
 
It is generally difficult, no doubt, to dissociate the question of 
happiness, individual or collective, from the wider question of values. 
But, in post-Revolutionary France, when deliberation on moral and 
political values in particular is conflictual through and through, this 
axis proves to be peculiarly intractable. A prolonged history of 
political instability generates, in turn, its own unhappiness. Here, I aim 
to conduct a case-study, seeking to identify what is distinctive about 
the attempts of Vigny in particular to say what happiness might amount 
to, given that the understanding of happiness which he rehearses in his 
poetry is in important ways negative, in other words, it is shaped by his 
efforts to deal with forces or experiences that cause unhappiness. 
From the crisis of values that spans much of the nineteenth 
century, the question of happiness arises in two ways. First, events 
give rise to happiness or unhappiness. Benjamin Constant describes 
1789 as ‘notre heureuse révolution’, because, being the first step in a 
process that leads to the adoption of a system of representative 
government, it helps to secure the conditions most likely to generate 
individual contentment within modern mass societies.1 But, as he also 
acknowledges, the conditions under which this outcome was achieved 
were far from ideal. The conflicts of the Terror prompt him to attempt 
 
 
1‘De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes’, an essay first published in 
1819,  in  Ecrits  politiques,   ed.  by  Marcel   Gauchet  (Paris:   Gallimard,   1997), 
pp. 591–92. 
 
 
a brief social psychology of the period. Anger is one of the passions 
which conflict arouses: ‘On ajournait la liberté, disait-on, jusqu’à ce 
que les factions se fussent calmées, mais les factions ne se calment 
que lorsque la liberté n’est plus ajournée […] on s’agite dans un cercle 
vicieux […] La force rend de plus en plus la force nécessaire; la colère 
s’accroît  par  la  colère’.2   The  Revolution  generates  a  history  from 
which unhappy experiences may still flow. Second, the scope of the 
political settlements characteristic of the modern state to cause 
happiness or unhappiness becomes a theoretical issue in its own right. 
Constant, once again, concedes that the typical trend of such societies 
is towards ever greater uniformity; the problem is that the resulting 
loss of local traditions is a source of discontent.3  The constitution of 
the good society remains, as a result, something of an open question. 
A whole range of factors – social, political, structural, conjunctural – 
prove to have a bearing on well-being. Constant is concerned above 
all to argue for individual freedom of choice as the source of the kinds 
of jouissance to which we attach importance in the commercial stage 
of society.4 Constant’s thinking is permeated by a central paradox: the 
individualism of private members of societies, as they pursue their 
own diverse interests, generates beneficial public effects, notably 
enhanced collective freedom from the arbitrary exercise of authority 
and, in turn, the possibility that increased autonomy gives of attaining 
fulfilment.5  And yet, while he regards this conception of freedom as 
 
 
 
2De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation (1814), in Ecrits politiques, p. 219. 
3De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, in Ecrits politiques, pp. 170–71. 
4See ‘De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes’, pp. 597–99. The 
theory  of the four stages  of society,  those of hunting,  pasturage,  agriculture  and 
commerce, is a pivotal element of Adam Smith’s theory of social institutions, as first 
developed in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. by R. L. Meek et al. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), I, 27 (p. 14). 
5Compare Adam Smith on the paradox of the ‘publick happiness’ that is typically 
generated by the self-interested actions of discrete groups in society who do not have 
‘the least intention to serve the publick’, in An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of 
the  Wealth  of  Nations,  II,  ed.  by  R.  H.  Campbell  and  A.  S.  Skinner  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 422. Smith goes on to appeal to a metaphor that was to 
become a notorious commonplace, claiming that the individual, ‘led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention’, ‘by pursuing his own 
interest […] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it’ (p. 456). On the desire for individual self-betterment as a 
 
 
paramount, together with the marked separation of the public and the 
private which it implies, he feels himself compelled at the end of ‘De 
la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes’ to distinguish 
his stance from a thoroughgoing utilitarian outlook: ‘L’œuvre du 
législateur n’est point complète quand il a seulement rendu le peuple 
tranquille […] Il faut que les institutions achèvent l’éducation morale 
des citoyens’.6  The happiness of whole societies is somehow more 
than the sum  of individual preferences. But, once again, just  how 
virtuous  collective  outcomes  might  be achieved  or  sustained  does 
seem to remain something of an open question. 
In fact, the logic of individual choice has the potential to be 
supremely slippery, with paradoxical outcomes as far as the quest for 
happiness  or  joy  is  concerned.  In  Notes  from  the  Underground, 
Dostoevsky’s  narrator  invites  us  to  imagine  a  type  who  will  ‘go 
against  […]  the  laws  of  reason’;  precisely  the  most  desirable 
advantage of all is to be able to repudiate those things which are held, 
on rational grounds, no doubt, to be ‘appealing and useful’. He 
acknowledges to the full the distinctiveness of a modern, individual- 
istic conception of freedom. But a perverse mobilisation of choice 
generates its own inverted and disruptive joy, that of achieving ‘this 
primary, most advantageous advantage which is the dearest thing to 
him’, however irrational it may otherwise seem.7 
In brief, happiness emerges as an idea that is both unstable and 
contested. To this disputed space, Vigny brings his own shifting and 
complex response. In a brief fragment from 1830, Vigny admits the 
possibility of doubt as to the existence of God: ‘Dieu, sais-je ce que 
vous êtes, et si vous existez?’8 All of the conflicts and the ruptures we 
have witnessed have the potential to generate extreme unhappiness. 
 
 
source of social benefits, see Charles L. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chs 2 and 7. 
6Ecrits politiques, pp. 618–19. On this strand in Constant’s thought and the tensions 
which sustain it, see Biancamaria Fontana, Benjamin Constant and the Post- 
Revolutionary Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 112–16. 
7Notes from the Underground – The Gambler,  ed. by Malcolm Jones, tr. by Jane 
Kentish (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 23–24. 
8Œuvres complètes, I, Poésie – Théâtre, ed. by François Germain and André Jarry 
(Paris:  Gallimard,  Bibliothèque  de  la  Pléiade,  1986),  p.  320.  Unless  otherwise 
indicated, all further references to Vigny’s poems will be to this edition and volume, 
and will be given by line number in the text. 
 
 
And this is the possibility to which the title of this fragment – ‘Colère’ 
– seems to gesture. Here as elsewhere in his work, Vigny’s ‘je’ hints 
both   at   the   emergence,   under   conditions   of   modernity,   of   a 
distinctively secular view of life and at the feeling of loss bordering on 
desolation that accompanies it. The crisis is apparently one of belief, 
but it may also have political overtones, since it would have some 
bearing on an absolutist ideology in which religion and government 
are interdependent. In other words, in the thinking and writing of a 
poet, the question of happiness demands to be addressed in its full 
scope – existential, ethical, political. Both this outlook and these 
feelings are again rehearsed and explored by Vigny in a later poem, 
‘La Maison du berger’, where the loss of familiar meaning is more 
fully and more painfully acknowledged. What we seem to witness is a 
shift in patterns of belief in tandem with the emergence of wholly new 
political institutions, beliefs and behaviours. What is distinctive about 
Vigny is just how this state of things precipitates a sustained, though 
discontinuous and tentative, reinvention of poetry as a universal 
medium, open to all of the problems of modern life and to its fleeting 
consolations. 
The acute sense that an alteration both radical and troubling in 
the political basis of contemporary society comes to be voiced once 
again at the point where, later in the same year, Vigny happens to 
consider the case of Constant. On the day of Constant’s burial in 
December 1830, Vigny reminisces on their one meeting, presenting 
him as an emblematic figure of disenchantment: ‘La dynastie des 
Bourbons l’importunait, et il a contribué à la renverser; et la tristesse 
qu’il a confessée à la tribune lui est venue de l’impuissance où il se 
sentait  plongé  de  rien  fonder  sur  les  ruines  qu’il  nous  a  faites’.9 
Vigny’s comments, coming so soon after the July Days, are by no 
means incidental: they amount to a judgment on Revolutionary and 
post-Revolutionary France, the entire period spanned by Constant’s 
ultimately unhappy career as a theorist of freedom. For Vigny himself, 
the experience of the July Days was almost fatal. Because he was 
reluctant, being a former soldier, to resist the Garde royale, he armed 
instead members of his household so as to defend it against any and 
 
 
9Œuvres  complètes,  II,  ed.  by  Fernand  Baldensperger  (Paris:  Gallimard,  1948), 
p. 925. 
 
 
all intruders. In the course of 29 July, Vigny incautiously put his head 
out of a window: ‘on m’a tiré trois coups de fusil dont les balles sont 
incrustées dans le mur au niveau de ma tête. Il ne pouvait être dans ma 
destinée  de  finir  là!’.  He  goes  on  to  draw  a  conclusion  that  is 
subjective in appearance, but which forms part of the same disabused 
attitude as he was to express when considering the case of Constant: 
‘En politique, je n’ai plus de cœur. Je ne suis pas fâché qu’on me l’ait 
ôté, il gênait ma tête. Ma tête seule jugera dorénavant et avec sévérité. 
Hélas!’.10  Two distinct, if implicit, conclusions emerge: French soc- 
iety has undergone a decisive transformation; but, despite Constant’s 
confident claims in favour of the distinctive freedom of the moderns, a 
form of politics equal to so far-reaching and, sometimes, so destruct- 
tive a process has yet to manifest itself. 
The brief fragment quoted above gestures towards a process of 
self-questioning amounting to an  existential crisis.  A major poem, 
‘Paris’, was begun in the same year. Here, what is momentous about 
the modern world is that it seems to exceed even an apocalyptic 
perspective.11 ‘Paris’ appears a contradictory poem, incorporating both 
an attitude of engagement giving rise to a series of sharply critical 
reflections on shifts in belief systems, be they political, religious, or 
ethical, and at the same time an apparently negative gesture of retreat. 
It records a series of exchanges between a je and a Voyageur 
concerning the state of the modern world, interspersed with passages 
of visionary description of Paris as the terrifying centre of a ‘monde 
mouvant’. Ostensibly written on 16 January 1831, the poem takes a 
topical turn when it invokes the now disappeared figure of Constant: 
 
– ‘Liberté!’ crie un autre, et soudain la tristesse 
Comme un taureau le tue aux pieds de sa Déesse, 
Parce qu’ayant en vain quarante ans combattu, 
 
 
 
 
10Œuvres complètes, ed. Baldersperger, II, p. 918. 
11Œuvres complètes, I, pp. 105–12. Our response to Vigny is likely to differ from the 
uneasy complicity we feel when reading Baudelaire – or Villon, as Michael Freeman 
remarks in a striking rapprochement. But there are aspects of Vigny’s work which can 
be linked to that of Villon, notably ‘a feeling for an infinity which goes beyond the 
here and now and beyond the grave’; see Michael Freeman, François Villon in his 
Works: The Villain’s Tale (Amsterdam /Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 24–26. 
 
 
Il ne peut rien construire où tout est abattu.12 
(ll. 115–18) 
 
Constant is identified by Vigny as the unnamed focus of these lines in 
a footnote and the attitude ascribed to him – one of ‘tristesse’ – is the 
same as in the diary entry of December 1830. The implicit judgment 
on modern politics is unmistakable: ultimately, the outcome of the 
progressive urge in political theory and action has been unhappy. The 
emphasis throughout the poem is in the main secular: in every city of 
the modern world, people must submit to suffering and death (ll. 238– 
39).  A prophetic  strain  would  indeed  be  misplaced:  once  God  is 
suspected to be dead, there must follow something of a collapse with 
regard to any providential narrative. Vigny’s stance vis-à-vis the 
modern is equivocal for specifically poetic reasons. If it were to 
manifest itself in a prophetic vein, then the poetic engagement with 
politics, with ‘[les] choses de la vie’, would be open to objections like 
those Vigny levels against Constant and against other thinkers. It is 
the ultimate exclusion both of the apocalytic and of the prophetic 
outlook that gives rise to a paradox which is, for Vigny, distinctively 
poetic:  the  refusal  to  prognosticate  simply  projects  forwards  the 
questions the poem asks.13 
These different writings by Vigny, because they link questions 
of politics with those of belief, crystallise what could be termed a 
continental modernity, as well as the ambivalent, if not disenchanted, 
responses it occasions. The emergence of new forms of human 
association – those of the democratic polity, the economy, and the 
culture of the nation state – takes place across the West, together with 
 
12Subtitled ‘Elévation’, it was in fact composed between November 1830 and the 
early months of the following year. I give a brief account of Vigny’s meditation on 
the ultimate political significance of Constant’s career, in ‘The Death of a Liberal: 
Four Lines on Constant by Vigny’, French Studies Bulletin, 100 (2006), 66–69. 
13See Yves Bonnefoy, for whom poetry, as a distinctive kind of human entreprise, was 
exposed in the mid-nineteenth century to a most serious crisis, even though it is a 
medium in which, notably so in the work of Vigny, the human mind comes to grapple 
with the collapse of the belief that the order unpinning the world would ultimately be 
revealed to us; see ‘L’Enjeu occidental de la poésie’, in L’Identité littéraire de 
l’Europe,  ed.  by Marc  Fumaroli  et al. (Paris:  PUF,  2000),  pp.  205–21  (p.  216). 
(Bonnefoy’s   piece   has  now   reached   an  anglophone   audience   through   James 
Petterson’s excellent translation, in ‘At Stake: Poetry in the Western World’, Common 
Knowledge, 8 (2002), 595–607.) 
 
 
the dramatic expansion of individualism in the material sphere. These 
are complex changes and they generate their own instabilities.14 In 
France, they coincide with a massive and fairly prolonged crisis of 
authority.15 The gradual emergence of a system of representative 
democracy has a bearing beyond the political in ways that are 
themselves complex and sometimes difficult; and, in France, the fact 
that the social changes attendant upon industrialisation occurred later 
than in other countries, notably later than in England, means that 
economic and demographic factors  bring their  own political 
pressures.16  The demise of absolutism was, then, protracted, violent 
and uncertain for several different reasons. In Vigny’s ‘Paris’, the city 
becomes the focus, part historical, part mythical, for the difficult 
emergence of the politics of a free democracy, a feature of its identity 
that was to become a commonplace – highly visibly so in L’Education 
sentimentale, but also in works in other languages, like Henry James’s 
The Ambassadors, where Strether senses ‘as if excited and exciting, 
the vague voice of Paris’ and imagines that he can recover something 
of ‘the days and nights of revolution, the sounds had come in, the 
omens, the beginnings broken out. They were the smell of revolution, 
 
 
 
14On these changes, on the tensions arising from the spread of republicanism through 
Napoleonic conquest, and on the kinds of political difficulties which novel forms of 
majoritarian democracy present, see Deepak Lal, Unintended Consequences 
(Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1998),  pp.  99–125.  The disruptive  impact  of such 
changes  in  absolutist  monarchies  can  be  gauged  when  these  are  compared  with 
England, where, by contrast, a deeply embedded sense of individualism and a highly 
developed and individualistic market society existed from the thirteenth century; so 
argues Alan MacFarlane, in The Origins of English Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1978); see pp. 165–88. 
15On the demand for freedom as a contestation of authority, see Constant: ‘Que le 
pouvoir s’y résigne donc; il nous faut la liberté, et nous l’aurons’, in ‘De la liberté des 
anciens comparée à celle des modernes’, p. 615. 
16Tocqueville cites these as causes of the February Revolution in 1848, in Souvenirs, 
ed. by Luc Monnier (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), p. 85. For a searching account of the 
anthropological and social as well as the political significance of democratisation in 
France, see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Sacre du citoyen: histoire du suffrage universel en 
France  (Paris:  Gallimard,  1992).  On  France  and  Spain  as  absolutist  monarchies 
which, because of their primary concern with the pursuit of political dominance, were 
vulnerable to long-term economic inefficiencies, see Douglass C. North and Robert 
Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 120–31. 
 
 
the  smell  of  the public  temper  –  or  perhaps  simply  the  smell  of 
blood’.17 
And indeed the emergence of the political and social institutions 
of modernity is vulnerable to disruption by continued violent spasms. 
This   is   precisely how   Tocqueville   interprets   the   revolutionary 
episodes to which, like Vigny, he was a witness. Tocqueville’s 
experience of the February and the June Days of 1848, as he attempts 
to reconstruct it in his Souvenirs, was not happy. Like Vigny, 
Tocqueville belongs to the generation for whom the long-term impact 
of  the Revolution  was  the  critical  issue  in  contemporary  life.  He 
begins his record by giving a mildly disenchanted view of the politics 
of the July Monarchy: the decades which followed the Revolution 
witnessed a ‘lutte acharnée’ between traditional aristocratic society 
and the emergent middle class, leading in turn to a period where the 
‘esprit particulier’ of the latter became the ‘esprit général’ of the 
government. What seems to result is a ‘très grand apaisement dans 
toutes les passions politiques’. Tocqueville claims to have sensed that 
this period of calm was about to come to an end; but the reaction he 
experiences   is   surprisingly   violent,   nonetheless.   He   views   the 
February Days  as  an  upheaval  which  puts  into  doubt  the  very 
possibility of sustaining a modern political settlement: ‘je savais que, 
si une grande révolution peut fonder la liberté dans un pays, plusieurs 
révolutions  qui  se  succèdent  y  rendent  pour  très  longtemps  toute 
liberté   régulière   impossible’.18     The   changes   characteristic    of 
Constant’s world of the moderns now seem at once irreversible and 
strangely abortive – an outcome which occasions in Tocqueville feel- 
ings  of  deep  and  bitter  unhappiness  and  which,  in  turn,  mirrors 
Vigny’s sense, eighteen or so years earlier in ‘Paris’, not just that 
things stand at an impasse, but that acute unhappiness is the very 
likely general outcome. When it comes to ‘[les] choses de la vie’, the 
poet can only say ‘Je ne sais’ (l. 251). The world may be on the verge 
of apocalypse – or not. We have no way of knowing. The Voyageur 
has the last word, voicing a conclusion that is at once sententious and 
a little flat: ‘Pour longtemps le monde est dans la nuit’ (l. 258). 
 
 
17The  Ambassadors,  ed.  by Christopher  Butler (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press, 
1985), p. 401. 
18Souvenirs, pp. 12–13, 88. 
 
 
An ambivalent attitude towards the modern world, a sense of 
subjective crisis, an active concern with contingencies which are 
ominous because imponderable: all of these attitudes connect with ‘La 
Maison du berger’, which I propose now to consider in some detail. 
The poem, which first appeared in the Revue des deux mondes in July 
1844, has a secular orientation not dissimilar from that of ‘Paris’, in 
that it again contests prevailing intellectual approaches to the modern 
social world, while presenting poetry as the space of a continuing 
engagement with the problems of life.19 One of the poem’s central 
enigmas is how it articulates a non-redemptive exploration of 
substantive unhappiness: it is through this exploration that a veiled 
and tentative conception of happiness can be said to emerge from its 
opposite. 
The poem opens by seeking a desired identification between the 
‘je’ and his interlocutor: 
 
Si ton cœur, gémissant du poids de notre vie, 
Se traîne et se débat comme un aigle blessé, 
Portant comme le mien, sur son aile asservie, 
Tout un monde fatal, écrasant et glacé; 
(ll. 1–4) 
 
And at first glance, the stance which it appears to rehearse is one of 
withdrawal: 
 
Pars courageusement, laisse toutes les villes; 
Ne ternis plus tes pieds aux poudres du chemin; […] 
La Nature t’attend dans un silence austère; 
(ll. 22–23; 29) 
 
But, as with ‘Paris’, its argument is more complex. The condition of 
desired identification is movement. What appears at the outset as a 
kind   of   desired   solipsism  à   deux   in   fact   combines   with   an 
unexpectedly diverse range of other stances. The opening gesture of 
retreat, it must in fact be understood, is virtual: the ‘lettre’ addressed 
to the absent Eva is a framework for reflecting on self–other and self– 
world relations, a line of thinking which is dramatically intensified, as 
we shall see, in the context of the poem’s closing stanzas. 
 
 
19Œuvres complètes, I, pp. 119–28. 
In  brief,  then,  the  poem  is  characterised  by  what  could  be 
 
termed a series of reflective as well as affective stances; these, as they 
succeed each other, result in sometimes abrupt shifts of register. The 
opening out of the poem to these diverse concerns, but not the shift in 
stance which is central to the poem’s ultimate impact, comes about in 
a sense fortuitously, for it is not merely the sheer range of the poem, 
but also its genesis, that make it one of the most complex in Vigny’s 
corpus.20   So,  the  first  nine  stanzas  of  the  first  part  represent  the 
opening of the ‘lettre’ to an absent Eva, at the end of which the ‘je’ 
envisages submitting to chance in the intensely private space which is 
created as much in the imagined exchange with her as in the ‘Maison 
du berger’: 
 
Je verrai, si tu veux, les pays de la neige, 
Ceux où l’astre amoureux dévore et resplendit, 
Ceux que heurtent les vents, ceux que la mer assiège, 
Ceux où le pôle obscur sous sa glace est maudit. 
Nous suivrons du hasard la course vagabonde. 
Que m’importe le jour? que m’importe le monde? 
Je dirai qu’ils sont beaux quand tes yeux l’auront dit. 
(ll. 57–63) 
 
What the ‘je’ seems to offer is a kind of joie de vivre embedded in the 
willed espousal of chance: such would appear to be the emergent 
significance of the gesture of retreat. 
But there then follow four stanzas on a railway crash which 
occurred on 8 May 1842, followed by five stanzas on the scope, if 
any, of affective and intellectual autonomy in a globalised world. The 
name  which  the  ‘je’  gives  to  this  latter  stance  is  ‘Rêverie’.  The 
contrast between these different threads is quite sharp, with the first 
two stanzas in the sequence on the train disaster following a different 
rhythmical pattern. In the face of the disaster, the ‘je’ articulates an 
 
 
20Very briefly, the composition of the poem extends from 1838, or possibly a little 
earlier, to November 1843; it is sent to the printers in May of the following year. The 
nine opening and the ten closing stanzas were initially elaborated as a single sequence 
and were separated only at the point where Vigny envisaged publication of the poem 
and was confronted with the problem of how to distribute his material into three more 
or less proportionate parts. For a comprehensive analysis of its genesis, see André 
Jarry, Alfred de Vigny: étapes et sens du geste littéraire (Geneva: Droz, 1998), pp. 
683–97. 
 
 
attitude of prudential caution, in that in the succeeding stanzas he 
reaches the conclusion that the development of commerce, and the 
transformation of social spaces which it implies, can be regarded as 
benign where it is also open to ‘les généreuses choses’ (l. 94), in other 
words, where the poetic impact of a reflective engagement with the 
human predicament can, if anything, be magnified. What this stance 
combines with, then, is the careful elaboration of an engagement of 
the kind which is a precondition of poetry in a world which is ‘rétréci 
par notre expérience’, a world in which chance is minimised, which is 
dominated intellectually by a conception of science that appears 
narrowly deterministic and where the actions of the individual are 
typically informed by rational and self-interested calculation. The 
progressive vision of ‘publick happiness’ which we found articulated 
in Smith and in turn in Constant is turned on its head: here the 
distinctive features of the modern world generate anxiety much more 
than they do contentment, though in the same opaque – or ‘invisible’ – 
way. 
Poetry, by contrast, being implicitly connected to ‘Rêverie’ as 
something  that  is  residually  committed  to  now  defunct  ways  of 
thinking and of being, can also represent a gesture of refusal – a 
paradoxical attitude, it must be noted, in that it seeks to exist on the 
margins of a view of the world which the poet does in fact 
acknowledge. At the end of the second part of the poem, this complex 
stance is strongly reaffirmed: 
 
Jamais la Rêverie amoureuse et paisible 
N’y verra sans horreur son pied blanc attaché; Car 
il faut que ses yeux sur chaque objet visible Versent 
un long regard, comme un fleuve épanché, 
Qu’elle interroge tout avec inquiétude, 
Et, des secrets divins se faisant une étude, 
Marche, s’arrête et marche avec le col penché. 
(ll. 127–33) 
 
The stanza opens with the affirmation of the necessary independence 
of the attitude of ‘Rêverie’; and the remaining five lines justify this 
claim,  emphasising  among  other  things  the  many  ways  in  which 
anxiety has become a pervasive thread in human life. This way of 
reasoning creates of itself a forward movement which makes the unit 
of  poetic  value  the  stanza,  rather  than  the  individual  line  –  a 
dimension  of  Vigny’s  writing  that  gives  the text  its  characteristic 
dynamism. Here, accordingly, no single line has the same rhythmical 
 
organisation; and further, it becomes clear, here as elsewhere, that the 
impact of a given movement within a single stanza results in part from 
how it comes to relate to the one that follows. In other words, there is 
a dynamism internal to the stanza which results from the interaction of 
the syntax with the rhyming scheme and from the rhythmical character 
of the stanza as a unit, subject to a forward movement which is 
perceived as the way in which a succeeding stanza can derive 
something of its own momentum from the one that precedes it. 
The ‘je’ is entirely absent from the second part and indeed from 
the  opening  six  stanzas  of  the  third,  returning  only  in  the  final 
sequence of ten stanzas originally connected to the poem’s opening. 
After  the  first  two  stanzas  in  the  second  part,  the  poet  adopts  a 
negative stance vis-à-vis poetry, before returning in more trenchant 
terms to the temporal perspective of the first part, by insisting on the 
scope of the thought of the past, though no more than the ‘Reste des 
nations mortes’, to perdure. The critique of poetry on which the ‘je’ 
embarks forms part, then, of a larger movement, affective in origin, 
but merging once again with the complex stance of withdrawal and 
engagement, whose object is modernity and the discourses through 
which it defines and justifies itself, for instance, through the claimed 
identification with happiness and fulfilment. There is a fundamental 
shift in this part of the poem: the ‘je’ mounts a critique of features of 
the modern world – notably, parliamentary democracy – which is 
closely informed by the demands of the poetic stance. Vigny’s adverse 
comment on political discourse could well be said to be simply 
reductive: he accuses politicians of populism, perhaps a little 
predictably. But, by the end of the second part of the poem, it is the 
imagination that is mobilised for the sake of the future benefit of 
societies which must exist on a quite different basis from those of the 
past. The poem offers some hints as to the essentially anti-positivist 
basis on which it proceeds to contest both populist politics and 
narrowly rational thinking: 
 
Mais notre esprit rapide en mouvements abonde: 
Ouvrons tout l’arsenal de ses puissants ressorts. 
L’Invisible est réel. Les âmes ont leur monde 
Où sont accumulés d’impalpables trésors. 
Le Seigneur contient tout dans ses deux bras immenses, 
 
 
Son Verbe est le séjour de nos intelligences, 
Comme ici-bas l’espace est celui de nos corps. 
(ll. 218–24) 
 
The paradox at this point is that the ‘je’ presents as almost sacred a 
kind of very marginal happiness which he will elaborate in the third 
part of the poem and which will remain essentially non-redemptive. 
The ‘lettre’ around which the poem is organised resumes, as we 
have already noted, in the closing ten stanzas of the third part. The 
opening of the final sequence echoes the earlier introduction of the 
emblematic Maison du berger: 
 
Il est sur ma montagne une épaisse bruyère […] 
Viens y cacher l’amour et ta divine faute; 
Si l’herbe est agitée ou n’est pas assez haute, 
J’y roulerai pour toi la Maison du berger. 
(ll. 43; 47–49) 
 
The ‘je’ speaks to Eva in a familiar imperative (‘Viens’), precisely the 
mode of address that links this gesture to the closing part of the poem, 
where the same natural scene is seemingly presented as a uniquely 
serene environment. What the enchanted atmosphere seems to betoken 
is some possibility of attaining a kind of joy, which, though very 
marginal, does seem tangible: 
 
Viens donc! le ciel pour moi n’est plus qu’une auréole 
Qui t’entoure d’azur, t’éclaire et te défend; 
La montagne est ton temple et le bois sa coupole, 
L’oiseau n’est sur la fleur balancé par le vent, 
Et la fleur ne parfume et l’oiseau ne soupire 
Que pour mieux enchanter l’air que ton sein respire; 
La terre est le tapis de tes beaux pieds d’enfant. 
(ll. 267–73) 
 
The return of the identificatory movement in fact masks a further shift 
in direction: now the ‘je’’s thinking on the secular world is centred 
much more exclusively on a subjective outlook – neither positivist nor 
anti-positivist, neither self-consciously poetic nor committedly 
intellectual. Within the third part of the poem, there is a movement 
(vastly more complex in scope than the fragment entitled ‘Colère’ 
with which I began, though concerned with the same complex 
problems) from a phase where the ‘je’ first seeks to define how an 
individual could work out a coherent social and political stance in the 
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world of practical affairs to one where the concern is ethical, directed, 
that is, at the question of how to live. 
The setting where the ‘je’ broaches this daunting enterprise is 
Nature. Because its temporality is not finite in the way human life is, 
Nature brings the question of happiness dramatically back into view.21 
There is, then, a sharp, if implicit, disjunction. The movement of 
identification  which  is  at  the  root  of  the  poem  manifests  an 
unexpected pathos: it will end in death conceived as absolute 
separation. This is what the ‘je’ concludes from his meditation on 
what Nature seems to say: 
 
C’est là ce que me dit sa voix triste et superbe, 
Et dans mon cœur alors je la hais, et je vois 
Notre sang dans son onde et nos morts sous son herbe 
Nourrissant de leurs sucs la racine des bois. 
Et je dis à mes yeux qui lui trouvaient des charmes: 
‘Ailleurs tous vos regards, ailleurs toutes vos larmes, 
Aimez ce que jamais on ne verra deux fois.’ 
(ll. 302–08) 
 
The ethical argument of the poem is consistently future-oriented, but 
ultimately is confronted with a temporality which it cannot control, 
yet which determines much of its meaning. The poem’s closing 
argument consists in the inevitably difficult attempt to articulate a new 
stance, one which acknowledges the finality of death, but still seeks to 
draw some positive conclusions regarding human purpose and 
happiness. While it is clear that the apparent movement of withdrawal 
from the world at the beginning of the poem is deceptive, its closing 
enigmatic gesture does not entirely resolve the uncertainty that hovers 
over the ‘je’’s complex project: 
 
Nous marcherons ainsi, ne laissant que notre ombre 
Sur cette terre ingrate où les morts ont passé; 
Nous nous parlerons d’eux à l’heure où tout est sombre, 
Où tu te plais à suivre un chemin effacé, 
A rêver, appuyée aux branches incertaines, 
 
 
21On the ways in which a fate that is death-directed both causes unhappiness and 
prompts a characteristically human search for meaning, see Jonathan Lear, Love and 
its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis (New 
Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. ix. 
 
 
Pleurant, comme Diane au bord de ses fontaines, 
Ton amour taciturne et toujours menacé. 
(ll. 330–36) 
 
The response of the ‘je’ is a global one in the sense that the poem’s 
reach extends to questions of cosmic belief and of practical reason, 
while it also engages with the scope of poetry as a medium that probes 
such questions – and with the affective or existential responses which 
they provoke. Modernity precipitates a misrecognition of poetry in 
which poetry has been complicit: this was the burden of the second 
part  of  the  poem.  In  the final  part,  there seems  to  emerge  some 
implicit  sense  in  which  poetry  can  be  the  space  of  an  effective 
response to the difficulties of a world in flux. Poetry is more or less 
explicitly identified with singularity. It is also identified perform- 
atively with a forwards movement, coinciding with an implicit self- 
reaffirmation and a relativisation of the characteristic value judgments 
of modernity, notably those concerning happiness. The closing part of 
the poem (originally, of course, part of the opening movement) opens 
up a new perspective: in addressing Eva, the ‘je’ articulates a panoptic 
vision which casts the earlier millennarian claims in a new light, in 
that statements regarding modernity are now juxtaposed with a much 
longer temporal vision which incorporates an account of thought as 
mobility  in  the  face  of  death.22    The  culminating  movement  of 
relativisation is powerful, but veiled: Vigny, here again, engages with 
the  discourse  of  modernity,  while  remaining  oriented  to  a  future 
where, even in the face of death, poetry can count for something. Thus 
the poem ends: with an acceptance of a purely human relativity in the 
face of nature and of death, where transience is the sign of a power 
that is distinctively human. At the same time, the future to which the 
poem is oriented remains provisional: it is essentially governed by 
chance and is linked to a process that is above all reflective. And, 
though the poem is predicated on an identificatory movement, in the 
end even this remains on the whole something virtual. 
 
 
 
22For valuable comments on how the poem can be read as a response to an essentially 
‘nocturnal’ crisis of belief characteristic of modern Western consciousness, see 
Bonnefoy, ‘Vigny, le peintre’, in Vigny: romantisme et vérité, ed. by Jérôme Thélot 
(Mont-de-Marsan: Editions Interuniversitaires, 1997), pp. 45–67. 
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The open, future-oriented stance is somewhat equivocal, then. 
Because so tentative, it remains exposed to the risk of effacement – 
such is the threat of the ceaseless resurgence of death, to say nothing 
of the enduring problem of human subjection to forces of alienation. 
Yet, for we readers of poetry today, a slightly different perspective 
perhaps emerges if we remember (breaking with the cult of isolation 
and of taciturnity with which Vigny himself increasingly identified) 
that the line of writing in which he contrives to situate himself proves 
to have, not just a past,23  but a future. In ‘Toast funèbre’, Mallarmé 
was to confront the same problems of belief and, in the opening line of 
his commemoration of Gautier, insists on the viability, in the face of 
death, of a wholly secular kind of happiness: ‘O de notre bonheur, toi, 
le fatal emblème!’.24 Though the poet is indeed fatally subject to a 
shared  mortal  end  (evoked  by  Mallarmé  in  terms  which  have  a 
residual religious echo: ‘l’heure commune et vile de la cendre’, l. 13), 
the only valid aspiration to survival is that afforded by poetry, by ‘la 
gloire ardente du métier’ (l. 12) which Gautier so exemplifies. The 
poet’s annihilation poses, nonetheless, a stark question: ‘Est-il de ce 
destin rien qui demeure, non?’ (l. 36). Consciously or not, the poet 
writes in the shadow of death and, when his own death comes, he 
prompts an aspiration in keeping with his ‘gloire’, one that is 
exclusively and defiantly poetic: 
 
Moi, de votre désir soucieux, je veux voir, 
A qui s’évanouit, hier, dans le devoir, 
Idéal que nous font les jardins de cet astre, 
Survivre pour l’honneur du tranquille désastre 
Une agitation solennelle par l’air 
De paroles, pourpre ivre et grand calice clair 
(ll. 39–44) 
 
 
23Bonnefoy appeals specifically to this history as a means of sustaining a kind of 
poetry that is somehow not ‘volée de soi’, citing notably Villon, whose poetry is 
distinguished by its commitment to the surplus of reality even in objects which derive 
from religion. Villon’s anti-clericalism is exemplary in that it amounts to a struggle 
against  the  conflation  of the  moral  with the  religious  (‘L’Enjeu  occidental  de la 
poésie’, p. 214). See also Freeman on the poet’s anti-monasticism and its ultimately 
catastrophic outcome, in François Villon in his Works, pp. 66–68, 79. 
24Stéphane   Mallarmé,   Œuvres  complètes,   I,  ed.  by  Bertrand   Marchal   (Paris: 
Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1998), pp. 27–28 (future references are by line 
number). 
 
 
 
Or  so  writes the  Mallarméan  ‘je’  who bears  witness  to the 
‘geste’ of the poet and to poetry. This story remains our own, that of 
the promise of flowers – ‘de paroles’ – which even the finality of 
death won’t cause to fade – and, perhaps also, the promise of a 
subjectivity open to a kind of happiness no less impossible, but one 
which,  through  poetry  and  the  risks  and  exhilarations  it  affords, 
remains somehow on the horizon.25 For Vigny, the world we inhabit is 
one of menace. Anger is, as we have seen, one possible response. But 
the outlook of the ‘je’ in ‘La Maison du berger’ is elusive in ways that 
may prove beneficial.26  The poem seems to offer its own ritual 
possibilities, chiefly a kind of loving commemoration ‘à l’heure où 
tout est sombre’ (l. 232).27  The gesture which the ‘je’ invites Eva to 
share consists in refusing to surrender to the kinds of unhappiness 
which are indeed all too pressing and which must for this reason be 
acknowledged. But the poem closes on a barely discernible 
dissociation:  the  sombreness  it  evokes  is  that  of  the  world,  not 
 
 
 
 
25A perspective  to which Bonnefoy  himself  also gestures:  ‘La poésie  en Europe, 
ç’aura été l’impossible: ce qui échappe à un être, au terme de son destin, comme 
l’immédiat à nos mots. Mais, s’il est donc vrai que la subjectivité soit aujourd’hui 
fracturable, et que poésie et science des signes puissent s’unir pour un rapport neuf du 
“Je” qui est et du “moi” qui rêve, quelle ampleur imprévue dans l’espérance, du coup! 
A l’heure où tant de nuit s’accumule, serions-nous au bord de la vraie lumière?’, in 
Entretiens sur la poésie (Paris: Mercure de France, 1992), p. 202. 
26On the ways in which an overt commitment to happiness as a teleological organising 
principle for human life can paradoxically give rise to discontent, see Jonathan Lear, 
Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 60. Lear’s response is to devise a theoretical practice 
characterised by ‘the willingness to live without principles’ (p. 165). 
27Vigny repeatedly insists in his notes and sketches for ‘La Maison du berger’ on the 
distinctive kind of happiness which the poetic act can yield: thus, he links the claim 
that ‘la Poésie est une volupté’ to the line ‘Poésie,  ô trésor,  perle de la pensée’ 
(Œuvres complètes, I, pp. 276–77). In poetry, ethical questions can be productively 
displaced from a theoretical space in the direction of one from which the experience 
of joy  is  not  excluded,  even if  it is  not explicitly  invoked  in individual  poems. 
Compare  Wordsworth,  for whom nature, above all else, offers the hope of some 
human renewal, even in the face of experiences of contemporary politics which are 
uniformly alienating; see Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry: 1787–1814 
(New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 152, 318. 
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necessarily of the subject.28  Its open stance extends to a portrayal of 
subjectivity through which we glimpse joys still accessible to us in a 
world which seemed at the outset ‘fatal, écrasant et glacé’ (l. 4) and, if 
we heed the successors who were to constitute something of Vigny’s 
own future, in poetry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28In ‘Toast funèbre’, the ‘ombre/sombre’ rhyme recurs as a couplet (ll. 37–38), though 
the order of the rhyme words is inverted. For an acute discussion of the ‘ombre’ 
which is all that will remain of the interlocutors in Vigny’s poem, see Jarry, Alfred de 
Vigny, pp. 826–29. 
